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Kuptz-Blinkinsop v. Blinkinsop, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 40 (Jul. 9, 2020)1
REAL PROPERTY – APPLICATION OF STATUTES ON DIVORCE DECREE

SUMMARY
The Court determined the lower court was correct in granting an ex-husband’s motion for
summary judgment and quiet title. There was no genuine issue of material fact, however the Court
held that the ex-husband was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The Court
concluded that the holding of Davidson v. Davidson did not apply to this case; thus, there was no
statute of limitation issue,2 the divorce decree in controversy did not require renewal, and the initial
action was barred by claim preclusion.
BACKGROUND
Trisha Kuptz-Blinkinsop and Thomas Blinkinsop jointly owned real property at 2042 Deer
Springs Drive in Henderson, Nevada (Deer Springs property). During divorce proceedings, Trisha
requested equal distribution and division of all community property and separate property assets.
The 2009 divorce decree awarded the Deer Springs property to Thomas as a sole and separate
property and subsequently ordered Trisha to execute a quitclaim deed to remove her name from
the title within ten days. Trisha did not execute the quitclaim deed and Thomas never brought
action to enforce the order.
In 2018, Trisha claimed that she was still 50-percent owner of the Deer Springs property,
contending neither she nor Thomas renewed the divorce decree as required by NRS 17.2143 and
Davidson,4 causing the decree to expire under NRS 11.190.5 Thomas counterclaimed for quiet title
and sought a judicial declaration of sole ownership of the Deer Springs property and judicial
estoppel against Trisha claim to any interest in the property. Thomas also moved for summary
judgment, stating that neither NRS 17.214 nor Davidson applied, and Trisha’s partition action was
barred by claim preclusion. The district court granted summary judgment and quieted title in favor
of Thomas, declaring him as the sole owner of the Deer Sprints property. Trisha appealed.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is proper if no genuine issue of material facts exist, and “the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”6 Neither party disputes the material facts in this
case. Therefore, the issue remains whether Thomas is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law because (1) Davidson does not apply, (2) Thomas was not required to renew the divorce
decree, (3) Trisha’s action was barred by claim preclusion.
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Whether Davidson applies to the facts of this case
In Davidson, the Court held that 2014 motion to enforce a 2006 divorce decree to pay onehalf of the marital home equity was time-barred under six-year statute of limitations of NRS
11.190(1)(a).7 Had the moving party renewed her judgment pursuant to NRS 17.214, discussed
below, the 2006 divorce decree would have been enforceable.8
Trisha argues the Thomas’s quiet title and declaratory relief counterclaims are time-barred,
as Davidson applies the NRS 11.190(1)(a) six-year statute of limitations to all aspect of the divorce
decree. However, NRS 11.190 specifically excludes actions for the recovery of real property.9
Therefore, the holding of Davidson does not apply to the case at bar.
Whether Thomas was required to renew the divorce decree pursuant to NRS 17.214
Trisha argues that the divorce decree expired, and was therefore void, as Thomas did not
renew it as required by NRS 17.214. The language of NRS 17.214 applies only to a “judgment
creditor” or his or her successor attempting to renew an unpaid judgment. 10 As Thomas is not a
judgment creditor or successor, he was not required to renew the divorce decree pursuant to NRS
17.214. The Court declined to interpret the statute to require property owners to renew their
judgments every six-years to preserve their ownership rights.
Whether Trisha’s partition action was barred by claim preclusion
Finally, the Court addressed if Trisha’s action was barred by claim preclusion. The Court
has adopted a three-part test for claim preclusion: “(1) the parties or their privies are the same, (2)
the final judgment is valid, and (3) the subsequent action is based on the same claims or any part
of them that were or could have been brought in the first case.”11
Thomas successfully illustrated that Trisha’s action was claim precluded by the divorce decree.
Because the parties are the same in both the divorce proceedings and the partition action, the first
part of the claim preclusion test is satisfied. Secondly, pursuant to the summary proceedings for
divorce explained in NRS 125.18, the divorce decree is classified as a final judgment.12
Furthermore, Trisha’s partition action was based on the prior divorce action which determined the
ownership distribution of the Deer Springs property satisfying the third and final part of the claim
preclusion test. Thus, Trisha’s partition action was barred by claim preclusion
CONCLUSION
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the lower court’s grant of summary judgment and
quiet title in favor of Thomas was correct. The Davidson application of NRS 11.190(1)(a) does
not apply to distribution of real property as the statute itself explicitly exclude real property.
Thomas was not required to renew the divorce decree under NRS 14.214. Finally, Trisha’s
partition action was barred by claim preclusion.
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